

How Does the Size of the Government and Economic Growth Affect the Participation Rate of Post-Obligation Education?

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Abstract

This paper uses the panel data of China's provincial level from 1999 to 2016 to systematically examine the impact of government size and economic growth on the participation rate of post-obligation education. By applying a fixed-effects model, I found that government-scale expansion can increase the enrollment rate of ordinary high schools, while economic growth will reduce the enrollment rate of ordinary high schools. The reason for this phenomenon is that the current adverse effects of economic growth are only an epochal phenomenon. With the reform of the distribution system and the increasing level of social equity, this effect will turn positive.

Keywords

Post-obligation education, ordinary high school enrollment rate, government size, economic growth.

1. INTRODUCTION

Since China explicitly enacted nine-year compulsory education in legal form in 1986, adolescents have generally accepted basic cognitive education, and the illiteracy rate has been greatly reduced. The enlightenment effect of compulsory education has initially appeared, and the level of social civilization has greatly improved. Benefiting from this system, children in poor rural areas have more development directions than agriculture, which leads to the issue of post-obligation education, that is, after nine-year compulsory education, including high school, university and above. Due to limited educational resources, post-obligation education usually requires high scores, higher tuition fees, and uneven distribution of regional and urban-rural resources. Coupled with the influence of some traditional concepts, the economic capacity of individual households is limited, which leads some students to face employment in junior high school. The inability to accept the impact of higher education on individuals is a lifetime, and it is difficult to achieve the full and free development of individuals.

The popularization of high school education is the goal set by the national "13th Five-Year Plan". In order to improve the enrollment rate in the high school stage, the Ministry of Education advocates adopting four measures. In short, it means building ordinary high schools, running rural high schools, and running secondary vocational schools. Accurate funding. Implementing policies on specific projects is the only way to achieve goals, and good policies require a solid theoretical foundation. The current literature studies the problems related to the enrollment rate of ordinary high schools, tending to use theoretical research methods [1-4], empirical analysis is relatively rare. In the process of constructing a set of theoretical systems for guiding policy, both theoretical research and empirical research are indispensable. In order to fill the gaps in the field of empirical research, this paper makes bold assumptions based on theoretical research: government scale and economy. Growth is two important factors affecting the

participation rate of education after the obligation. Subsequently, using the panel data of China's provinces in 1999-2016 for a total of 18 years, the following conclusions were obtained by using the fixed-effect model regression: 1. The expansion of government scale can increase the enrollment rate of ordinary high schools. 2. Current economic growth has an adverse impact on the increase in the enrollment rate of ordinary high schools. These results provide a new idea: in order to increase the enrollment rate of ordinary high schools as much as possible, it can strengthen the government's control over the society, increase fiscal expenditures, especially for education, and at the same time slow down economic growth, and strive to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor. , take a more balanced development path of higher quality. The pros and cons of the expansion of the government scale are still inconclusive, and most of the current literature believes that the government should have a scale [5-9]. Therefore, based on the principle of maximizing social welfare, the government should strive to explore and approach the optimal scale, while trying to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor to reverse the adverse impact of economic growth on the enrollment rate of ordinary high schools.

In summary, the article organization is as follows: the first part is the introduction, the second part is the literature review, the third part sets the model and briefly describes the data, the fourth part is the empirical analysis result of the model, the fifth part gives the conclusion and corresponding The sixth part is the conclusion of the policy recommendations.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Post-Obligation Education

Nowadays, the literature discusses the post-obligation education, mainly focusing on the children of migrant workers. He Xiaoxiao [10] pointed out that education after the obligation is the key link to break the intergenerational transmission of migrant workers. Due to the existing household registration system, urban-rural dual education system and the "admission to school by locality" policy, migrant children must return to their native places to receive high school education after they have completed their compulsory education. Otherwise, they can only borrow large sums of money to borrow or Entering private high schools and vocational middle schools, this inhibits the group from accepting post-obligation education. Xu Limin [11] believes that the high dropout rate of rural junior high school graduates should start from the perspective of long-term education system reform and short-term targeted adjustment. Liu Jie [12] pointed out that under the current conditions, education will not be feasible after the volunteers have released the children's children's obligations. When the various supporting systems are still not perfect, the education of the children of migrant workers will be blindly released. There will be a series of new problems.

Some scholars started from foreign experience and studied foreign situations and used them for reference. Xu Guoxing [13] found that Japan established a multi-funding method based on central funds, and formed a form of subsidy based on the combination of student loans and loans. Undergraduate students are the main recipients of coverage of non-compulsory education at all stages and types of funding systems. In addition, the so-called education voucher system, first proposed by liberal economist Friedman, is a concept of public education funding issued by the government to families of school-age students in the form of vouchers with certain currency purchasing power. Huang Bin [14] pointed out that through the implementation of the education voucher system, it can effectively reduce the opportunity cost of education and increase the chances of low-income families continuing to receive education.

2.2. Ordinary High School Enrollment Rate

The enrollment rate of ordinary high schools is the number of enrolled students in ordinary high schools divided by the number of graduates in junior high school. The following is the

general rate of high school, which is an excellent indicator of the degree of education participation after the measurement of obligations. China's general high rate has been growing steadily. According to the 2014 data (the national average general rate is 56.25%), the current average high rate in China is about 60%, and the provinces are roughly in the range of 50%-70% (2014). The provinces range from 45% to 70%. However, behind the overall growth, Bao Ning and Peng Daiyan [1] pointed out that there is a huge gap in the enrollment rate of urban and rural ordinary high schools in China, and there is a trend of further expansion. The city has increased from 40% in 1985 to 55.4% in 1999. In the same period, the rural area dropped from 22.3% to 18.6%. The gap between the two has increased from 1.8 times to 3 times, and the absolute gap has increased by 19 percentage points. They believe that the gap between urban and rural income levels and economic development levels is fundamentally derived from the gap between urban and rural education. Li Zhenli [4] further studied the low enrollment rate of rural high schools and found that the lack of policy support, the heavy burden of farmers and the unfavorable rural public opinion orientation are the main reasons for this phenomenon. She suggested that the government should pay close attention to improving relevant policies and increase the rural areas. The support of high school education and above has eliminated the inherent "learning uselessness" thinking in rural areas through publicity activities.

2.3. Government Scale

The factors affecting the size of the government are analyzed. The existing literature analyzes the reasons for changes in the size of the government from various angles, such as economic openness, fiscal decentralization, and economic development. There is still no unified opinion on the impact of economic openness on the size of the government. Generally speaking, there are two views, namely "efficiency effect" and "compensation effect". Economic openness and relaxation of trade barriers, trade tariffs are small, and tariffs account for a large proportion of government revenues, so that government revenues decline, the government can play a smaller role, that is, the government scale is reduced. On the other hand, economic openness has relaxed the free flow of capital and other factors. In order to attract scarce capital resources for domestic development, governments must make some degree of concessions, reduce taxes, and transfer rights to the market. Fiscal revenues are reduced and economic intervention is reduced [15]. In other words, in order to adapt to economic openness, the government should reduce its intervention in the economy and play a major role in improving market efficiency. This is the so-called "efficiency effect."

The "compensation effect" means that when the degree of economic openness increases, the risk of the economy increases accordingly. The government hedges such risks by increasing government expenditures, and thus the size of the government increases. Rodrik [16] found that the scale of government and the degree of openness of the economy showed a significant positive correlation. His explanation is: when the degree of foreign trade of the country increases, the government as a caretaker of the economy needs to be macroscopic. Adjust the angle to deal with external risks.

For these two effects, domestic scholars use different data, different dimensions, and different analytical methods to make research, and the conclusions are not the same. Mao Jie, Guan Hanhui and Lin Zhixian [17] used the multinational panel data from 1850 to 2009. The study found that economic opening has different effects on the size of the government in different periods. Before the First World War (1850-1913), the economy opened up. The size of the government has a significant negative effect, mainly because the "efficiency effect" is playing a role. After the Second World War (1950-2009), the degree of economic openness was mainly a positive effect on the size of the government. At this stage, influenced by Keynesianism, the government changed its status from "night watchman" to "caregivers" and had The greater control, the "compensation effect" plays a huge role. After the 1980s, the rise of the neoliberal

economy made the image of the government “caregivers” weaken in the OECD countries, gradually handing over some social security to the market, reducing the “compensation effect” and the effect of economic openness on the size of the government. Also shown as negative. From this they concluded that the main source of change in the role and function of government is the “compensation effect”.

Based on the cross-country panel data, Mei Dongzhou and Gong Liutang [18] focused on the analysis of China's provincial panel data and found that in developing countries, the size of the government and the economic opening are “inverted U-shaped”; in the central and western regions of China, It is positively correlated and there is no nonlinear relationship; in developed countries and the eastern part of China, the size and openness of the government are significantly negative. Their explanation is that the relationship between openness and government size is determined by two forces: one is the external risk shock brought by openness, and the other is domestic market reform brought about by external competitive pressure. The developed regions have a good market structure, high efficiency, and a stronger ability to cope with risks and competition, resulting in a significant negative relationship. Some conclusions from the study of provincial external risks [19] also confirm this point.

Lv Bingyang [9] studies government expansion from the perspective of market distortion, and proposes that market allocation of resources can improve economic efficiency, and that government allocation of resources can improve organizational efficiency. The former has vitality and the latter reflects order. When the demands of order overwhelm the demands of vitality, market distortions inevitably appear. He believes that the expansion of government size is sometimes due to some non-economic motives. Yu Huayi [20] has taken a different approach, from the urbanization rate, urban density, population urbanization rate, output large urbanization rate, urbanization rate of high administrative level cities and other path analysis to the size of the government, found urbanization rate, The increase in urban density and population urbanization rate has a positive effect on the scale of local governments, and the impact of large urbanization on the scale of local government is higher than that of simple urbanization. The change in the rate of output of large cities has a U-shaped impact on the size of local governments. The impact of China's large urbanization on the size of local governments is mainly achieved through the expansion of high-administrative cities. The impact of large urbanization rates on the size of local governments is affected by the large urbanization rate.

From the perspective of economic development, the "Wagner's Law" points out that with the expansion of state functions and economic development, the fiscal expenditures required to guarantee the exercise of these state functions are increasing, that is, the relative scale of fiscal expenditures increases with the increase in per capita income. However, some studies [21] rejected this view, saying that there is an inverted U-type relationship between government size and economic growth. Since the government can only replace the market in a limited way, the moderate government scale has Help to establish a system of property rights protection. In the local dimension, the “Leviathan Hypothesis” asserts that fiscal decentralization can lead to non-cooperative fiscal competition between local governments, thus automatically curbing the expansion of government size. Gao Nan and Liang Pinghan [22] thus extend to the level of division of interests of the department. They believe that the degree of division of interests of the department has a significant positive impact on the scale of local government institutions. Excessive interest groups will encourage institutions to expand to meet the distribution of interests. Fan Ziyang and Zhang Jun [23] found that there is a very strong “sticking paper effect” on local financial transfer payments. Transfer payments will cause a more serious expansion of local government size relative to local fiscal revenue.

The existing literature studies the size of the government, mostly set it as a dependent variable, and explores which factors affect the size of the government. In this paper, in order to

find out the influencing factors of post-obligation education, the government scale is taken as one of the explanatory variables, and a new perspective is taken to look at the problem that junior high school graduates stop participating in post-obligation education.

3. THEORETICAL MODEL AND DATA DESCRIPTION

3.1. Basic Assumption

There is little empirical discussion on the study of post-obligation education participation rate, and there is no conclusion about its influencing factors. On the basis of considering the family factors, it is assumed that the size of the government will have a certain impact on the participation rate. There are two aspects to consider: First, the higher government scale means that the government has more fiscal expenditures, and the corresponding education departments also have more expenditures. The education subsidy can help alleviate the problem of poor students' lack of money to go to school, thus reducing the dropout rate. Second, the higher government scale will affect the civic awareness subtly. The excessive market intervention may lead to a conservative atmosphere and reduce society. The risk-return expectation, which will promote the students to further education to a certain extent. In addition, it can also be assumed that the degree of economic development will affect the rate of participation in education after the obligation. On the one hand, the advantage of economic growth is the improvement of people's living standards, and the material complementage, so that families can leave more money for their children to receive education, which will increase education participation. However, it should be noted that economic growth is different from economic development. The rise in per capita GDP may be accompanied by a widening gap between the rich and the poor. This is not conducive to the continued education of low-income people. On the other hand, the commercial wave brought about by reform and opening up, Along with the rise of the economy, people gradually changed their employment ideas. Some cases of low-educational winners were enlarged, attracting some students to work or start a business after graduating from junior high school, and reducing the participation rate after the obligation.

3.2. Model Building

Based on these assumptions, using government size and economic growth as explanatory variables, a fixed effect model is derived:

$$edu_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times scale_{it} + \beta_2 \times pergd_{it} + \beta_3 \times raise_{it-1} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

Among them, the subscripts i and t represent the i -th province and the t -th year respectively, and edu is an index that replaces the ordinary high school enrollment rate. It is measured by dividing the number of ordinary high school enrollment in each province by the total population at the end of the year. Perform statistics, multiplied by one hundred and expressed as a percentage. Generally speaking, the number of students enrolled in ordinary high schools is divided by the number of junior high school students to indicate the enrollment rate of ordinary high schools. However, the complete number of provincial junior high school graduates cannot be found (the official website of the National Bureau of Statistics only announces the provincial data in 2011-2014), so the population of the province is replaced, and the proportion of junior high school graduates in different provinces is different, which may cause errors. To this end, the addition of juvenile child support is controlled by the variable $raise$, which is the ratio of the number of children (0-14 years old) to the number of young adults (15-64 years), in order to match the edu variable units appearing in the previous article. The same number is expressed as a percentage in 100% to describe the proportion of junior high school graduates in the total population. Since the age of most junior high school graduates is around 15 years old, the

dependency ratio data is one year behind. The government scale uses the current unified measurement method, which is the ratio of government fiscal expenditure to GDP. Pergdp is an indicator of per capita GDP and is used to measure the economic level of each province. η represents the provincial fixed effect and ε is the random error term.

Considering that the ratio of government expenditure to GDP does not reflect the fiscal expenditure allocated to individual households, the path of government participation rate after the impact of government size is likely to involve the amount of subsidies allocated to each family education. Take a new variable perexp to represent the size of the government. It is the ratio of provincial financial expenditure to the total population, and a new model is drawn:

$$edu_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times perexp_{it} + \beta_2 \times pergdp_{it} + \beta_3 \times raise_{it-1} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

The model we used earlier only includes the province's fixed effects, and different years may have an effect on the dependent variable due to certain events. For this reason, the time fixed effect ξ is added to the following model to construct a two-way fixed effect model:

$$edu_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times scale_{it} + \beta_2 \times pergdp_{it} + \beta_3 \times raise_{it} + \eta_i + \xi_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

3.3. Variable Setting and Data Description

A brief description of the variables is given in Table 1. It should be noted that some scholars use the number of institutions to measure the size of the government. However, when exploring the impact of government size on post-obligation education, this paper mainly considers the role of education expenditure, which has little to do with the number of institutions.

Table 1. Variable description

variable name	Variable description
edu	Post-obligation education participation: High school enrollment/The total population of the province×100
scale	Government scale: Financial expenditure/GDP
perexp	Per capita fiscal expenditure: Financial expenditure/The total population of the province
pergdp	Per capita GDP: GDP/The total population of the province
raise	Child-raising ratio: Number of children (0-14 years old)/Number of young adults (15-64 years old) × 100

This paper uses panel data from 31 provinces and cities in 1999-2016 (excluding Hong Kong, Macao Special Administrative Region and Taiwan Province), in which the child-raising ratio is lagging behind (1998-2015). All data are from the official website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The child dependency ratio is similar to the sample survey. Since the data was missing in 2001, the data were replaced by the average of 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003 and 2004.

Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the primary variable data. The data show that compared with the average, the government scale, per capita fiscal expenditure, and per capita

GDP have large standard deviations, which is related to the uneven development of China's regions and the different local fiscal tendencies.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of major variables

variable name	Number of observations	average value	Standard deviation	median	Minimum value	Maximum
edu	558	0.5753563	0.157966	0.5837531	0.1695418	0.9948689
scale	558	0.2145824	0.1693152	0.1734978	0.0629594	1.379161
perexp	558	0.5901683	0.6113466	0.391871	0.0409417	4.797523
pergdp	558	2.748139	2.242887	2.095664	0.2526954	11.81276
raise	558	26.9014	8.486254	26.75	9.6	57.78

After making basic assumptions, this part selects the fixed effect model to study. This is because the development status of different provinces is different, and the education level varies widely. The mixed OLS regression analysis on the panel data will lead to the setting error. In addition, through the Hausmann test, the virtual proposition that the fixed effect and the random effect model are not significantly different is rejected, so the fixed effect model is selected. The following will focus on the empirical analysis.

4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Firstly, the LSDV method is used to compare the advantages and disadvantages of the mixed OLS regression and fixed effect models. The results show that the virtual variables of most provinces are significant, so the null hypothesis that "all individual dummy variables are zero" can be rejected. That is, there is an individual effect, and mixed regression should not be used. Significant results were obtained using the LM test, which was also confirmed. In order to investigate how to choose between the fixed effect model and the random effect model, the Hausman test is used to reject the null hypothesis that the two models have no significant difference. Therefore, we choose to use the fixed effect model.

Table 3 gives the results of the regression analysis. In the fixed effect model, the coefficient of government size is mostly significant and positive. In the setting (7), even if the per capita fiscal expenditure perexp represents the government scale, the coefficient is still 5 The % level is significantly positive. In the setting (5), although the government scale factor is not significant at the 10% significance level, the p value is only 0.106. These results confirm the assumptions made above that the expansion of government scale has increased various types of fiscal expenditures. The increase in educational expenditures has reduced some of the expenses for students to go to school. At the same time, the scholarship policy has flourished, which will encourage students to further enroll in further studies. In addition, civic awareness changes with changes in the size of the government. Larger government sizes often lead to a conservative social atmosphere in which students tend to continue learning to pursue stability.

In the settings (3) and (4), the control variable was not added to the child-raising ratio, and the R-square values in the obtained model group were small (only 0.173 and 0.192), and the R-square value in the group after the addition was reached. It is 0.5 or more, so it can be considered that it is necessary to add the control variable. In setting (6), the time-fixed effect construction bidirectional fixed effect model is added, and the government scale factor is not significant (p value is about 0.411), which may be due to the collinearity of the year fixed effect and the government scale, or the data measurement process. There is an error in it, but the result is still positive, supporting the previous assumptions.

Table 3. The impact of government size on post-obligation education participation rate: 1999-2016

	Mixed OLS		FE					RE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
scale	0.147*** (3.76)		0.741*** (3.53)	0.899** (2.71)	0.271 (1.67)	0.075 (0.83)		0.356* (1.85)
pergdp	-0.028*** (-6.61)	-0.040*** (-7.38)		-0.012 (-1.25)	-0.048*** (-8.01)	-0.089*** (-6.46)	-0.055*** (-8.05)	- 0.045*** (-7.06)
Raise (Lag period)	-0.008*** (-6.75)	-0.008*** (-6.78)			-0.025*** (-15.73)	-0.006* (-1.98)	-0.026*** (-12.94)	- 0.021*** (-17.71)
perexp		0.065***(4.31)					0.042**(2.63)	
Constant term	0.828*** (21.00)	0.853*** (21.38)	0.416*** (9.25)	0.416*** (7.36)	1.310*** (25.47)	0.618*** (5.01)	1.402*** (21.80)	1.183*** (21.50)
Year fixed effect						Y		
Hausman test value			37.58***	67.41***	92.00***	21.55***	98.73***	92.00***
R-sq	0.091	0.098	0.173	0.192	0.558	0.760	0.553	0.555
Number of observations	558	558	558	558	558	558	558	558

Note: ***, **, and * represent significant levels of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The mixed OLS estimate and the fixed effect model FE are t-statistics in parentheses, and the random effect model is the z statistic in parentheses. Both the fixed effect and the random effect model adopt clustering robust standard error correction, and R-sq in both models are within R-square. After adding the year fixed effect to the fixed effect model, the annual dummy variable coefficients are all significant at the 1% significance level.

In the fixed effect model of Table 3, the per capita GDP coefficient is basically negative, which is different from our experience and cognition. Usually we think that the effect of this variable on the post-obligation education participation rate is positive: more wealth can support individuals to receive more education. However, it cannot be denied that per capita GDP does have a negative influence on the participation of education after the obligation. First, China's current problem of uneven distribution of wealth, accompanied by the increase in per capita GDP is indeed the income gap continues to widen, high-income people compete for educational resources, raise the price of education, low-income income growth is slow, unable to afford more and more High education costs. Second, the open trend of thought brought about by economic development has subtly influenced the thinking of contemporary people. People have broken the conservative attitude and learned the useless theory has risen. This has a negative impact on continuing education. The above positive and negative effects exist at the same time, and finally show negative, indicating that the current negative effect dominates, which may be related to the current imbalance of economic development in China. Based on this, I speculate that with the further development of China's economy, the level of civic awareness culture will gradually increase, the social distribution pattern will become more fair, the positive impact will be overwhelmed, and the per capita GDP coefficient will be positive.

Similarly, the coefficient of child rearing ratio is significantly negative. The explanatory variables we selected were the number of high school enrolled students/the total population of the province. Since the number of high school enrollment/the number of junior high school graduates was actually requested, the children's dependency ratio (number of children/ages/young adults) was added to control. As the population changes are relatively stable and there is a certain trend, the number of children and adolescents can be used to replace the number of junior high school graduates, and the total population of the province can

be replaced by the number of young and middle-aged people. In this way, the higher the dependency ratio, the lower the participation rate after the obligation, the higher the economic development of the region with higher dependency ratio, and the lower the education rate after the obligation.

In the settings (1), (2), and (8), mixed OLS estimation and random effects analysis are performed to complement the analysis process, and can be used as a robustness test. The results are consistent with the fixed effect, that is, the government scale factor is significant Positive, the coefficient of per capita GDP and dependency ratio are both significantly negative, indicating that the results of the fixed effect model are robust.

In addition, education popularization may have a certain relationship with population density. In provinces with small population density and scattered living, school construction is difficult because it is necessary to thoroughly consider the surrounding areas, and students are far from the school, and the cost of schooling is much higher, which is not conducive to students continuing to participate in education. In the fixed effect model, the population density is added as a control variable, the remaining variables are still significant, and the original model is still robust.

5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The empirical evidence shows that the expansion of government scale has a positive positive effect on the post-obligation education participation rate. Increasing the size of the government will help to spread the post-obligation education in the whole society, and its mechanism of action will not be repeated here. But the bigger the government, the better? Obviously, not only the government departments, but too many organizations will significantly reduce the operational efficiency. China is currently in the stage of market economy, and the market plays a decisive role in resource allocation. In order to better play the role of the government, it must limit the excessive expansion of the government and take into account all aspects. utility. There is an optimal value for the size of the government. At this optimal value, the entire social welfare is maximized.

The current increase in per capita GDP will lead to a decline in the level of participation in post-obligation education. The crux of this situation is that the gap between the rich and the poor continues to widen, and the root cause is the pursuit of efficiency and insufficient consideration of fairness (mainly income distribution equity). In order to achieve an ideal state, it is necessary to adjust the policy direction in the long-term, and adopt a mitigation method to stabilize and carry out the order, such as the collection of estate tax, property tax, etc., transfer payments to all levels at all levels, and poverty alleviation work continued to strengthen.

According to the data, the ratio of child rearing and edu in the provinces (the number of high school enrollments/the total population of the province) has been decreasing year by year. China is currently facing a serious problem of population aging. As the number of new populations decreases, as these groups of adults enter the society and participate in labor, there will be social problems of supporting a large number of elderly people with a small number of laborers. The demographic dividend will cease to exist and China's economic growth will continue. The speed will also gradually slow down. Fortunately, the ruling party is aware of this problem and has introduced a comprehensive policy for the second child since the Fifth Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party in 2015. However, in order to solve the problem of population aging, the current second-child policy is not enough. The liberalization of the policy is only an institutional permit, and parents still face financial constraints. For this reason, the second-child policy must be accompanied by a series of reproductive incentives. Combine boxing to achieve long-term social stability.

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